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EVIDENCE: "GOOD CAUSE" HELD TO
DEFEAT THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
WHEN A CORPORATION IS SUED BY ITS
SHAREHOLDERS
In Garner v. Wolfinbargert the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that in a suit against a corporation by its shareholders the
attorney-client privilege was available to the corporate client on a
limited basis, subject to being overcome by a showing of "good
cause. ' 2 Several stockholders of the First American Life Insurance
Company of Alabama (FAL), initiated a class action alleging
violations of the Securities Act of 1933, 3 the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934,1 SEC rule lOb-5,- the Investment Company Act of 1940,6 the
Alabama Securities Act,7 and common law fraud, seeking to recover
the purchase price paid for FAL stock from FAL and its officers and
directors. In addition, the stockholders, claiming injury to the
corporation itself resulting from alleged fraud in the purchase and sale
of securities, brought a derivative action against various individual
defendants on behalf of the corporation. The shareholders attempted
by deposition to obtain information concerning advice given by
FAL's attorney, Richard Schweitzer,8 related to the issuance and sale
of stock. The corporation and Schweitzer himself claimed that the
attorney-client privilege barred the divulgence of both the advice given
to the corporation by Schweitzer and the communications received by
him from FAL. The privilege was also claimed with respect to certain
documents in Schweitzer's possession, which were sought under a
subpoena duces tecum. In granting the motion for an order requiring
Schweitzer to answer the interrogatories and to produce the requested
documents, 9 the district court held that the privilege was unavailable
1. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
2. Id. at 1104.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a etseq. (1964).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a el seq. (1964).
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l et seq. (1964).
7. ALA. CODE tit. 53 §§ 28-65 (Cum. Supp. 1969).
8. R. Richard Schweitzer served as attorney for the corporation in connection with the
issuance of the FAL stock here involved. After the transactions sued upon were complete he
became its president. The case concerns Schweitzer's activities only during the period he acted as
attorney for FAL.
9. The latter motion was treated by the district court as a motion to produce under FED. R.
Civ. P. 34.
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when asserted by a corporation against plaintiff stockholders.10 The
court of appeals vacated the district court's order" and remanded for
further proceedings to determine whether the plaintiffs could make the
requisite showing of "good cause" in conformity with its opinion.
The attorney-client privilege dates back to English law during the
reign of Elizabeth I.13 The privilege was originally based on the oath
and honor of the attorney to keep his client's secrets and was therefore
vested solely in the attorney. As the law became more complex, it was
recognized that legal advice was essential and that one should be free
to seek such advice confidentially. To encourage free com-
munications, the privilege was extended to the client. 4 Although
subjected to periodic attack by commentators, 15 the privilege is
strongly entrenched in comtemporary legal practice. The requirements
of the privilege as it exists today are enumerated by Dean Wigmore:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
adviser in his legal capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,
(8) except the protection be waived."'
This attorney-client communications privilege is not coterminous
with the attorney's work product privilege. The latter, although in
some respects more inclusive than the attorney-client communications
privilege,, is limited in that it is qualified rather than absolute and can
be overcome by a showing of "necessity or justification."'"
For many years the privilege was assumed to be available to the
corporate client. In fact, both the American Law Institute's Model
Code of Evidence" and the Uniform Rules of Evidence" included
10. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 280 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ala. 1968). This opinion by District
Judge Grooms was criticized in Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholders' Suits,
69 COLUM. L. REv. 309 (1969).
11. 430 F.2d at 1104. The defendants appealed from the district court order under the
interlocutory appeals statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964).
12. 430 F.2d at 1104.
13. See, e.g., Comment, The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, the
Role of Ethics. and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 235 (1961).
14. Id.
15. E.g., J. BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, bk. IX pt. IV, c. 5, in VII WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 474 et seq. (J. Bowering ed. 1840) reproduced in part in 8 J. WIGMOE,
EVIDENCE § 2291 at 549-51 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Morgan, Foreword to the MODEL CODE
OF EVIDENCE 22-31 (Am. L. Inst. 1942); Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication
Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALF. L. REv. 487 (1928).
16. 8 J. WIGMOR, supra note 15, § 2292.
17. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,512 (1947).
18. A.L.I. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 209 (1942).
19. UNIFORM RusS OF EVIDENCE rule 26(3) (1953).
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corporations among the clients who could assert the privilege. It was
not until 1962, in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas
Association," that the general assumption of its applicability to the
corporate client was questioned. Finding no express holding on the
issue, the district court reasoned that the privilege is not unlike the
privilege against self-incrimination which can only be invoked by
natural persons 2' and that the degree of confidentiality required was
not present in the corporate setting; therefore, a corporation could not
invoke the privilege. This decision was promptly reversed by the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which held that "the attorney-
client privilege in its broad sense is available to corporations ... "12
The court indicated that the privilege applies to corporations for the
same reasons it applies to individuals:
The purpose of the privilege is to facilitate the administration of justice by
encouraging full disclosure by the client to the attorney. . .[There is a] right
and absolute necessity for confidential disclosure of information by the client
to the attorney to gain the legal advice sought thereby. .... 2
The court declined to decide under what circumstances, if any, the
privilege would be inapplicable to the corporate client, stating that the
nature and extent of the privilege should be developed "on a case by
case basis." A great deal of litigation has occurred in the wake of
Radiant Burners to determine the parameters of the corporate
attorney-client privilege. Much of this has dealt with the term
"'client" as applied to corporations to determine which individuals can
speak for the corporate entity in its capacity as a client. In Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. ofAmerica,21 the privilege was held to be
available to those "affiliated with the corporation as employees,
officers, directors, or 'outside counsel.' "28 A similar view was taken
in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.," where it was said
that the privilege would attach to communications from any officer or
employee of the corporation. The United Shoe case also held that the
privilege applies to legal communications to house counsel as well as
to outside counsel. s
.20. 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. I H. 1962).
21. 8 J. WmMoRE, supra note 15, § 2259a.
22. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314,323 (7th Cir. 1963).
23. Id. at 322, 324.
24. Id. at 324.
25. 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954).
26. Id. at795.
27. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
28. Id. at 360.
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As to the precise question in Garner, whether the privilege is
available to a corporation when the disclosure is sought by its
stockholders, there was no American precedent. Two English cases,
cited by the district court," Gouraud v. Edison Gower Bell Telephone
Co. of Europe,3° and W. Dennis and Sons, Ltd. v. West Norfolk
Farmers' Manure and Chemical Co-operative Co.,31 held that the
privilege was not available to a corporation sued by its stockholders.
The Dennis case involved discovery of an independent accountant's
report in the possession of counsel,32 while Gouraud concerned
discovery of documents prepared by an attorney for the corporation.33
In arriving at its decision in Garner the court of appeals attempted
to strike a balance between the policies of confidentiality and
disclosure. u The stockholder plaintiffs, who prevailed below, claimed
the privilege was totally unavailable to the defendants. The corporate
defendants, on the other hand, asserted an absolute right to claim the
privilege. 35 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected both
contentions, holding instead that the privilege was neither inflexibly
absolute nor totally unavailable. The court found that the privilege
was not absolutely available to the corporation because of the
continuing validity of traditional exceptions to the privilege for
communications in contemplation of a crime or fraud and for
communications to a joint attorney.36 The court indicated that the
first exception might be extended beyond its normal limitation to
prospective criminal transactions,37 stating that "[t]he differences
29. 280 F. Supp. at 1019.
30. 57 L.T. Ch. 489 (1888).
31. [1943] 2 All E.R. 94 (Ch.).
32. Id. at 96.
33. 57 L.T. Ch. at 500.
34. The availability of the privilege involves a complex problem of choice of law. The order of
the district court appeared to treat the Alabama standards as controlling. The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit disagreed, stating that "the choice of law cannot be settled by reference to
any simple talisman, but can be arrived at only after a consideration of state and federal
interests that are inseparable from the factors bearing on the availability of the privilege itself."
430 F.2d at 1097. Since the case was based primarily on a federal question claim, the court felt
free independently to weigh the issues.
35. The corporate defendants were supported by the American Bar Association, which
appeared as amicus curiae arguing in favor of the absolute privilege.
36. The privilege and its traditional exceptions would be given federal statutory
underpinnings according to proposed rule 5-03 of the Rules of Evidence for the United States
District Courts and Magistrates. See 46 F.R.D. 161, 249-51 (1969). There are three other
exceptions relating to claims through a deceased client, breach of a lawyer's duty to his client,
and documents attested by a lawyer. Id. at 251.
37. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra nbte 15, § 2298.
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between prospective crime and prospective action of questionable
legality, or prospective fraud, are differences of degree, not of
principle. '" s The joint attorney exception, which applies whenever an
attorney acts for two or more persons who have become adversaries in
a lawsuit,.3 was found to be relevant in disputes between the corporate
entity and its shareholders. Citing .Pattie Lea, Inc. v. District Court,40
where because of the joint attorney exception the statutory privilege
for communications between a public accountant and his corporate-
client did not prevent discovery in a derivative action brought by
stockholders, the court noted that an attorney is usually employed by
the corporation for the benefit of all stockholders. Nevertheless,
considering the compelling interests which surround the privilege, the
Fifth Circuit held that a corporation should not be absolutely barred
from asserting the privilege merely because the suit is instigated by
some stockholders but that the privilege should be available to the
corporation "subject to the right of the stockholders to show cause
why it should not be invoked in the particular instance."" The court
suggested that an in camera inspection be used in ruling on the
availability of the privilege and outlined several factors which might
be considered in determining whether "good cause" is present,
including the number of shareholders and the percentage of stock they
represent; the nature of the shareholders' claim; the apparent necessity
of the information and its availability from other sources; and
whether the communication related to past or prospective actions
which were either criminal, illegal, or of doubtful legality. 42
The Garner decision is likely to produce a great deal of litigation.
Derivative actions and suits by stockholders against the corporation
will often raise the issue of the discoverability of corporation-attorney
communications. If the availability of the privilege ultimately rests on
a finding of good cause as defined in Garner, litigation may be
expected similar to that which followed the Supreme Court's ruling in
Hickman v. Taylor" requiring a showing of "necessity" for discovery
of an attorney's work product. The new discovery rules, however,
evidence a desire to reduce the number of cases in which a showing of
38. 430 F.2d at 1103.
39. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 2312.
40. 161 Colo. 493,423 P.2d 27 (1967) (en bane).
41. 430 F.2d at 1103-04.
42. Id. at 1104.
43. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).SeeC. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 82, at 363 (2d ed. 1970).
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good cause will be required44 in order to remove some of the confusion
which necessarily surrounds a good cause requirement. Perhaps the
court in Garner could have reached a more workable result if the
claim of absolute privilege were sustained with its traditional
exceptions. If the communications concerned prospective criminal or
fraudulent activities, discovery would be permitted under the existing
exception. 5 Whether the materials sought fall within the exception
could be determined by the judge through an in camera inspection.
Interrogatories would be permitted only if directed toward
communications which originally concerned prospective criminal or
fraudulent activities. The joint attorney exception poses the greatest
problem, and its applicability is difficult to determine in stockholders'
suits. In cases where the corporate counsel is obviously working for
the benefit of the stockholders as well as the corporate management
and where the two interests are not adverse, the exception should
apply to permit discovery. In theory the corporate attorney should
always be working in behalf of the stockholders. However, in the
modern corporate world there are many instances where the interests
of the stockholders and management are adverse, such as when
management consults counsel for legal advice aimed at avoiding or
minimizing actual or potential shareholder complaints. When the
attorney acts on behalf of the corporate management to the detriment
of some or even all stockholders, the rationale behind the joint
attorney exception fails, and it should not apply."6 By adhering to the
44. The good cause requirement has been stricken from FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (motion to
produce), as amended in 1970. Prior to 1970 the rule read "Upon motion of any party showing
good cause therefore . . ."; the amended rule simply states "Any party may .... " The
Advisory Committee's note (a) to then proposed rule 34 states that: "Good cause is eliminated
because it has furnished an uncertain and erratic protection to the parties from which production
is sought and is now rendered unnecessary .... Preliminary Draft ofProposedA mendments
to Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 F.R.D. 211,256 (1967).
45. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
46. The judge should consider applicability of the joint attorney exception in lignt of the
surrounding circumstances, focusing his attention on the nature and content of the information
sought through discovery. The issue will normally arise when the privilege has been asserted in
lieu of responding to oral or written interrogatories or as an excuse for failing to produce
requested documents. The party seeking discovery will apply to the court for an order
compelling an answer under FED. R. CIv. P. 37(a). See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note
43, §§ 84, 87, 90. At this point in the proceeding the scope of discovery will no longer be a
matter of speculation, and the judge can rule on the applicability of the privilege in the light of
the interrogatories to which it has been asserted. When the privilege is claimed with respect to
the production of documents, the judge may utilize an in camera examination of the materials in
formulating his decision.
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absolute privilege as limited by its exceptions, the court could have
avoided the litigation and confusion which accompanies a good cause
requirement while providing for the same ultimate result in the vast
majority of cases.
